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Abstract—Traditional firewalls have the ability to allow
or block traffic based on source address as well as destina-
tion address and port number. Our original ROFL scheme
implements firewalling by layering it on top of routing;
however, the original proposal focused just on destination
address and port number. Doing route selection based in
part on source addresses is a form of policy routing, which
has started to receive increased amounts of attention. In this
paper, we extend the original ROFL (ROuting as the Firewall
Layer) scheme by including source prefix constraints in route
announcement. We present algorithms for route propagation
and packet forwarding, and demonstrate the correctness of
these algorithms using rigorous proofs. The new scheme not
only accomplishes the complete set of filtering functionality
provided by traditional firewalls, but also introduces a new
direction for policy routing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Firewalls have long been a mainstay of network secu-
rity. While their utility has diminished in recent years
[1], due to increasingly rich topologies, they are still
valuable. In recent work [15], [16], we extended firewalls
to work with MANETs (Mobile Ad Hoc Networks),
using routing protocols to implement the firewall layer.
In a MANET, a ROFL (Routing as the Firewall Layer)
serves two important purposes: it not only helps imple-
ment a security policy, it causes unwanted packets to
be dropped as early as possible, thus conserving battery
power.
In common with most firewalls and routing protocols,
ROFL makes its decisions based on destination addresses
and port numbers. For wired networks, this is quite
proper, since it is not possible to trust source addresses
coming from beyond the firewall [5]. In MANETs, where
connectivity patterns are constantly changing, the situa-
tion is subtly different. While it remains true that the be-
havior of “untrusted” nodes (i.e., those not protected by
the firewall) cannot be relied upon for security purposes,
adding source address constraints to MANET rules have
a second, and equally important function: they define the
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boundaries of the policy region. That is, source address
rules define the boundary between the “inside” — the
portion of the network protected by the firewall — and
the outisde. In a traditional wired network, the firewall
itself is the boundary marker, with the network topology
determining the inside and outside.
Consider the MANETs shown in Figure 1. In Fig-
ure 1(a), nodes I1 and I2 provide firewall functionality
against outside node O1. In Figure 1(b), nodes I1 and
O1 have moved, changing the connectivity patterns. I2
can no longer reach I1 except by going through O1;
in addition, I4 now has a direct link to O1 and must
activate firewall mechanisms against traffic originating
from it. We must now rely on O1’s source address to
make such decisions, rather than on a fixed topology. (As
is discussed later, we in fact rely on the cryptographically
verified network identity of a network neighbor. By con-
trast, a fully distributed firewall, of the type described
in [1], could have n2 security associations, between
every pair of nodes that are communicating. In fact, if
we wish we can often have even fewer cryptographic
associations: if a neighbor’s purported identity is not
named as “trusted” for any firewall rule, its true identity
is irrelevant and can be ignored.)
In this work, we show how to extend ROFL to use
source address rules to determine policy region bound-
aries. Since ROFL relies on routing, we are perforce
describing a new form of policy routing (Section II).
We provide proofs that our algorithms (Section IV) are
correct (Section V), and show how to incorporate two
criteria, cost and risk, into a routing metric framework
(Section III). We use our new metric to map ROFL into
the routing algebra framework (Section VII).
II. POLICY ROUTING IN ROFL
Our proposed ROFL [16] scheme allows early drop of
unwanted traffic by intermingling filtering information
with routing announcement. Traditional firewalls have
the ability to allow or block traffic based on source
address as well as destination address and port number.
Doing route selection based on source addresses is a
form of policy routing. The current version of ROFL per-
forms traffic filtering focusing on destination IP address















Fig. 1. Two different topologies in a MANET, after O1 has moved.
scheme by including source prefix constraints in route
announcement.
A. The Scheme
A routing announcement in ROFL is of the form
R = {d : s/m, M}
where d is a destination address prefix, s is the service
port number, m is a prefix length, and M is a metric. We
introduce a source prefix constraint S into the scheme,
R = {d : s/m, S, M}
where S indicates a set of source address prefixes such
that data traffic coming from those address prefixes
is allowed to access service s provided by destination
address d. More precisely, we define S = {p1, p2, ..., pn};
each pi (0 ≤ i ≤ n) is a source address prefix. Therefore
no source prefix constraint is specified if S = φ. (Alter-
nately, we could simply set S = {0/0}, i.e., all addresses
are accepted; for clarity in this paper, we prefer to
distinguish between no source prefix constraints and one
that happens to have no effect.) We remark that in some
situations, it is possible to implement S as a Bloom filter
[2] on the set of source addresses or networks of a given
prefix length. Bloom filters are a space-efficient data
structure that can compress the representation of a set of
members in a compact manner, albeit with some chance
of false positives. Bloom filters are particularly useful in
MANETs, where there is little topological structure and
each allowed node may be identified by a flat address.
Source prefix constraint in ROFL controls the propa-
gation of routing advertisements as well as the packet
forwarding procedure. A routing announcement will
be passed to a node if and only if the node itself is
allowed to access the advertised service. During packet
forwarding phase, a packet will be dropped immediately
if it is coming from a source whose address is not spec-
ified in the source prefix constraint of a matching route.
Therefore, routing advertisements in this new scheme
are handled similarly to any other routing announce-
ments, except that another level of checking needs to
be performed based on the packet’s source address.
The source node and any intermediate routers do a
longest-prefix match on the advertisement. The packet is
forwarded if and only if such a matching route is found
and the source address in the packet header is contained
in the source prefix constraints of that matching route;
Otherwise, the packet is dropped.
The new scheme implement the complete set of fil-
tering functionality provided by traditional packet filter
firewalls by adding source prefix filtering into routing
advertisement. For example, to allow data traffic coming
from source address p1 to reach destination host d on
port number s, we simply announce a routing advertise-
ment R = {d : s/48, {p1}, M}. Blocking certain traffic is
a bit trickier. If p1 is the only source address that is not
allowed to access service s on host d, we could announce
R = {d : s/48, S, M} with p1 /∈ S. Otherwise, if d wants
to completely block traffic on port s only, it announces
R = {d : s/48,∞} together with R′ = {d/32, M}. Recall
that traditional firewalls allow the wild card ∗ to appear
in any field of source address as well as destination
address and port number. In our new ROFL scheme, ∗
in destination port number is equivalent to d/32 and ∗
in source address can be described as S = φ. If ∗ appears
in the destination address field, we can easily adjust the
prefix length m to cover the corresponding subnet.
In the above scheme, route selection is based in part on
the source address. Therefore the actual route announce-
ment becomes a form of policy routing. There are two
obvious approaches to inserting policy constraints into
routing announcements. First, all relevant nodes along
the route propagation paths could create or modify the
policy statement, in accordance with some central policy.
A better approach would be allowing only the node
advertising the service — the route originator — to em-
bed a source prefix constraint in routing announcement.
Subsequent receivers of this route announcement should
not alter the embedded policy statement. We suggest
the second approach for a few reasons. First of all, it
is the route originator that has the best knowledge of
who is or is not allowed to access a certain service.
Second, allowing intermediate routers to modify pol-
icy statements requires some kind of trust relationship
established amongst them. More importantly, the first
approach might work for static nodes; but would not be
able to cope with dynamically changing topologies in
some wireless environments, such as MANETs.
B. The Transit Node Problem
Consider the network topology shown in Figure 2. A
node in Net A is advertising a service that a node in
Net B wishes to access; however, the transit node T is
not an authorized source for this service. That is, the
source address policy advertised for this service does
not include T; it does, however, include Nets B and C.
What should happen?
One option would be to permit traffic from B to
transit T; after all, Net B is an authorized source. This
in turn would require that the border node in Net A
advertise the service to T, which would presumably pass
it on to Net B. This option is insecure: when packets
for the service arrive at Net A, it is not possible to tell
whether they originated from Net B or were forged by
transit node T.
We thus adopt the following policies:
1) Routing advertisements are never propagated to a
node not authorized for that service, according to
the originator’s policy.
2) Packets for a service are only accepted from nodes
to which routing advertisements were sent. In a
wired net, this is generally easy; in a MANET,
it will likely require some form of cryptographic
authentication of the neighboring node, since in a
wireless environment it is generally very difficult
to determine the precise source of a packet.
Note that these principles are not related to route ag-
gregation. A shorter prefix may be transmitted to T if
and only if such a prefix already existed and T was
authorized for it.
Net A Net B
Net C
T
Fig. 2. Two subnets connected by both a transit node and a transit
net.
III. REVISITING THE ROUTING METRIC
As always, our routing protocol requires a metric
M that describes “cost” of a path. Metric construction
varies. In BGP [11], the AS hop count is used. In OSPF
[10], the network administrators specify arbitary metrics
for each link.
Our needs are more complex. As described in [15],
we require both a cost metric C and a risk metric R.
Intuitively, “cost” represents the total expense of using a
given link. It may reflect bandwidth, power limitations
and the difficulty of replacing or recharging batteries,
etc. “Risk”, by contrast, is related to the safety of a par-
ticular transmission. A node may have been captured or
otherwise compromised (a significant issue for MANETs
operating in hostile territory); if so, it should not be used
for the path. The risk metric captures the exposure of a
node to such events.
Our routing metric must handle both of these con-
cepts. Furthermore, we wish for a scheme that can
optimize both simultaneously, with the tradeoff between
higher cost and lower risk made by local authorities.
This tradeoff may vary over time; furthermore, it may
be different for different services.
We define the cost to be the property of a link; risk is
the property of a node. This is a reasonable approach on
a MANET. As topologies change, the power consumed
by a transmission will vary, thus affecting its cost. Simi-
larly, in a battlefield environment the location of the front
line may change, and with it the physical danger to any
given node.
The tradeoff between cost and risk is represented by
a value γ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. The actual metric used for route
calculations is thus M = γC + (1− γ)R.
While the precise sources of these values are not
crucial, we do offer some plausible suggestions. We do
suggest, however, that in general they should change no
more frequently than the time required for the routing
state to converge, or routing loops could occur.
Link costs are best determined by the transmitting
node. If nothing else, it has the best knowledge of its
battery state and the power required to send a mes-
sage. In MANETs, a meaningful approach may be to
define link costs as proportional to the geographical
distance between two nodes. In wireless communication,
it is well-known that short-hop communications can
improve the capacity of wireless, because short-range
transmissions cause less interference than long-range
transmissions. Hence, it is more preferable to choose a
long path with many short-hop communications than a
short path with a few of long-hop communications. This
is best accomplished by using a sublinear relationship
between distance and cost. Also, the link costs can be
proportional to the number of neighbors of the transmit-
ter; the more neighbors a node has, the more interference
the transmitter will inflict on or receive from others.
Risk is more problematic. In combat situations, an
enemy may prefer to capture certain military ranks. In
such situations, nodes with lower-ranking soldiers may
be evaluated as a lower risk. Often, nodes are the best
judge of their own risk levels; in other situations, they
may be centrally determined. In either case, the actual
value used must be known by, and hence transmitted
to, all nodes that need to calculate M for a given hop.
Generally, this will be the node’s immediate neighbors,
as everyone else will simply use the value of M broad-
cast by the routing protocol. That said, in environments
where γ changes considerably more rapidly than C and
R, it may be worthwhile transmitting C and R rather
than M.
γ has the most intriguing properties. It could be set
centrally; alternatively, each node could use its own
values. Again, what is important is that all nodes agree
on M for each link; this can be done either by only
broadcasting M, or by broadcasting 〈C ,R, γ〉 in each
advertisement.
Note that in the absence of aggregation points, metrics
for a given service d : s are never compared with
those for another service: the longest-prefix match is
always preferred, regardless of the difference in metric.
Therefore, all of these values can be service-specific; in
particular, γ could be advertised by the service origina-
tor d : s, and thus more properly be viewed as γd:s.
By folding cost and risk into a single value, the
routing system automatically picks the optimum path
between any two points. The total routing expense, then,
is ∑i,j Mdi:s j , the sum of the individual metrics. The total
system expense, though, depends not just on the state of
the routing system, but also on the traffic matrix. This is
not known (or knowable) locally. Accordingly, we could
in fact use M = ΓC + (1− Γ)R, where Γ is a centrally-
specified function of γ. By varying it, the overall system
expense can be optimized.
IV. ALGORITHMS
Routers are generally composed of two fundamental
mechanisms, the control plane and the data plane. The
control plane, sometimes known as route generation,
produces a valid path from source to destination by
exchanging routing information with other nodes. The
data plane, or message forwarding, relays packets from
node to node until they reach their final destination,
following the selected route. In ROFL, we implement
packet filtering by layering it on top of routing. ROFL
is agnostic to the specific type of routing protocols used;
only slight modifications are needed during the route
propagation and the packet forwarding phases.
Because we do not change route calculations or prefix
lookups, our new ROFL scheme can cope well with any
distance vector or link state algorithms: route announce-
ments in ROFL with source prefix filtering are handled
the same way as conventional ones during this phase.
There are some changes, however. Therefore, in this
section we present our algorithms for route propagation
and packet forwarding.
A. Route Propagation
Suppose a service provider with destination address d
issues a routing advertisement R = {d : s/m, S, M} with
S being the source prefix constraint. Let Nb denote the
set of neighbors for each node u. We use the following
algorithm for route propagation:
ROUTEPROP(u, Nb)
1 if u is the service provider of s
2 R ← genRt(d, s,m, S, M);
3 else
4 R, S ← recvRt();
5 calculateFIB(R);
6 for each neighbor h ∈ Nb




The above algorithm distinguishes different behaviors
of a node u depending on whether u is the route origina-
tor (i.e. the service provider of s) or not (Line 1). Initially,
the service provider generates a routing announcement
R with appropriate routing information inclosed (Line
2), and then propagates R to all the neighboring nodes
which are allowed to access service s (Line 6-10). Upon
receipt of the routing announcement R, a node extracts
the source prefix constraint information from R (Line 4),
calculates its forwarding information base (FIB) to reflect
the update from newly received route (Line 5), and then
forwards R to its neighbors in a similar fashion (Line
6-10).
B. Packet Forwarding
When a routing path is established between a source
and destination pair by underlying routing protocol,
every node within a service’s policy region will consult
its local routing table TR, as well as the source prefix
constraint to make the packet forwarding decision. More
precisely, when a node u receives a packet K from its
neighbor, it executes the following algorithm:
PKTFORWARD(u)
1 K ← recvPkt();
2 ps, pd ← procPkt(K);
3 if u is the destination
4 DONE
5 else
6 R ← LPrefixMatch(TR, pd);
7 if R 6= φ
8 S ← extractRt(R);




Upon receiving data packet K (Line 1), node u retrieves
source and destination addresses ps, pd respectively from
the packet header (Line 2). If K arrives at its destination,
we are done (Line 3-4); Otherwise packet K needs to
be further forwarded based on u’s local routing table.
Node u performs longest prefix matching on destination
address pd (Line 6). If a matching route R is found, u
extracts the source prefix constraint from R (Line 7-8).
Then the packet is forwarded towards its destination
if and only if no source constraint specified or it is
originated from a legitimate source allowed to access this
service (Line 8-10). Otherwise, the packet is discarded
(Line 12).
C. Discussion
Our route propagation and packet forwarding algorithms
described above are similar to those dealing with con-
ventional routing advertisements. With our new ROFL
scheme, though, there is an additional check against the
source prefix constraint which constraints route propa-
gation and packet forwarding decision at each node.
A crucial question in any firewall design is defining
which nodes should be allowed access to the protected
service. In ROFL, this translates to defining for which
routing announcements are forwarded to which nodes,
i.e. the policy region. With source constraints added
into routing announcement, the service provider has full
control of the propagation of its service announcement.
On one hand, routing announcements won’t be seen by
nodes that are not allowed to access this service; On the
other hand, data packets originating from illegitimate
sources will be dropped far earlier, since each router
along the path is now acting as a firewall to perform
packet filtering based on the destination address and
port number as well as source address.
V. CORRECTNESS
We claim that our new ROFL scheme with source
prefix filtering will not cause any routing mistakes.
More precisely, under the assumption that the under-
lying routing protocols are correct, we claim that our
algorithm (a) will produce equivalent results for packets
not blocked by policy constraints, and (b) will properly
drop unwanted packets.
THEOREM 1 Correctness of the Route Propagation
Algorithm
The route propagation algorithm ensures that route
advertisements for certain service only propagates to
legitimate nodes that are allowed to access this service.
Proof Suppose a service provider T generates a rout-
ing advertisement R = {d : s/m, S, M} to announce
its service s with source prefix constraint S. Without
loss of generality, our discussion focuses on scenarios
with the presence of a valid source prefix constraint (i.e.
S 6= φ). Let pu represent the address of a node u. When
R is propagated into the network before it reaches any
aggregation point, to demonstrate the correctness of this
algorithm, we have two separate scenarios:
1) pu ∈ S If the current node is allowed to access
service s provided by T, then u should be able
to see the route advertisement R originated from
T. According to line 6-8 in our route propaga-
tion algorithm ROUTEPROP(u, Nb), if u is a direct
neighbor of T, it should receive R from T. If u is
multiple hops away from T, it can receive R from
its neighbors; otherwise, it implies that none of
its neighbors are allowed to access service s. Since
transit nodes are not permitted to carry such traffic
in our scheme, u cannot establish a valid path to T
by any means.
2) pu /∈ S If the current node is prohibited from
accessing service s provided by T, then u should
not see route advertisement R originated from
T. Lines 9-10 in our route propagation algo-
rithm ROUTEPROP(u, Nb) guarantee that none of its
neighbors will forward the routing advertisement
to u since pu /∈ S.
Therefore, the route propagation algorithm guarantees
that illegitimate nodes won’t see routing advertisements
originated from the service provider.
THEOREM 2 Correctness of the Packet Forwarding
Algorithm
The packet forwarding algorithm ensures that permitted
packets will arrive at the destination following the
selected path; whereas non-permitted packets will be
dropped early by intermediate routers along the path
acting as firewalls.
Proof The correctness of packet forwarding algorithm
relies on the assumption that the underlying routing
protocol will generate a valid routing path between each
pair of source and destination nodes. Suppose a packet
K is originated from a source node with address ps to
access service s provided by destination node T. With
the new ROFL scheme, each router along the selected
path acts as a firewall. To demonstrate the correctness of
our packet forwarding algorithm, we have the following
two separate cases:
1) ps ∈ S Packet K is coming from a legitimate
source allowed to access service s. Each router u
along the path performs longest prefix matching by
consulting its local routing table. Once a matching
route R is found, u makes a forwarding decision
through a second level of checking against source
prefix constraint S embedded in route R. Since
ps ∈ S, u decides to forward this packet according
to line 6-10 of the packet forwarding algorithm
PKTFORWARD(u). The same process repeats until
K reaches its final destination.
2) ps /∈ S Packet K is coming from an illegitimate
source prohibited from accessing service s. Each
router u along the path performs longest prefix
matching by consulting its local routing table. If a
matching route R is found, u makes a forwarding
decision through a second level of checking against
source prefix constraint S embedded in route R.
Since ps /∈ S, the packet is dropped immediately ac-
cording to line 11-12 in PKTFORWARD(u), that per-
forms packet filtering; Otherwise, K is still dropped
according to the underlying routing protocol.
Therefore, the packet forwarding algorithm guarantees
that permitted packets will arrive at destination follow-
ing the path generated by underlying routing protocol;
non-permitted packets will be dropped by intermediate
routers along the path that also perform packet filtering
functions based on destination address and port number
as well as source address.
VI. AGGREGATION POINTS
Although ROFL as defined will work without further
enhancement, installing it as part of a larger network
could be seen as unfriendly: blasting that many extra
routes into, say, the Internet is considered improper.
Indeed, the entire rationale for CIDR [6] is that distant
networks need only see a single short prefix that covers
many networks; ROFL should not frustrate that scheme.
We propose two basic approaches to resolving this:
external and internal aggregation.
External aggregation is the approach taken by to-
day’s ISPs to deal with overly-long prefixes announced
via BGP. In one variant, known as proxy aggregation,
an ISP will generate a single short prefix that covers
multiple longer prefixes, and re-announce the shorter
one rather than the long ones. In practice, this is very
rarely done. The second variant, occasionally known as
“satanic philtres” [12], is unilateral: an ISP will drop
announcements for too-long prefixes. It assumes that the
covered networks will be reachable via some shorter pre-
fix; if they are not, their administrators should arrange
for proper CIDR-based addresses.
This latter issue (as well as politeness) impels us to
incorporate an aggregation scheme into ROFL. (Other
justifications for ROFL aggregation are given in [16].)
We define an aggregation point as a node that re-
ceives full ROFL announcements but generates fewer re-
announcements of shorter prefixes. Typically, this is done
at the boundaries of a MANET, though it can be done
at other points, both within the MANET and outside
it. There are three basic issues: how aggregation points
are defined, what prefix should be announced, and what
metric should be used.
For the first, we use notation similar to source prefix
constraints: we define the ROFL region as a set of
prefixes. Any neighbor whose address is not in this set
receives only the shorter, covering announcement. Note,
though, that the aggregation policy prefix is not the
same as the firewall source prefixes; the two are used
independently. That is, packets from the wide-area net
are dropped if they do not meet any source address
constraints for firewall rules; furthermore, firewall rules
will frequently exist within the ROFL region.
The aggregation policy is generally a matter of static
configuration, and hence is not passed along via a rout-
ing protocol. However, since in a MANET any node
can be a boundary node, all nodes must have this
configuration information. Exactly how this is provided
is beyond the scope of this work; we assume that it will
be done as part of general node provisioning.
We treat the actual prefix to be re-announced similarly:
it is a static policy decision, installed on all nodes.
Metrics are a more interesting problem, since we
may wish to preserve some notion of cost even in the
wide-area network. Consider: a MANET may consist of
several subnets, with multiple attachment points to the
wired network. If a given subnet is much closer to one
of them, this information should be preserved.
It is not obvious how to do this. Even if everyone
is using the same values for Ci, Ri, and γ, aggregation
points will see many values. Which should be used? The
minimum? The maximum? The mean? The median? We
suspect that median is correct, but that mean is easier to
calculate.
One more optimization can be introduced. As ex-
plained in [15], local optimizations can be introduced.
The routing algebra is used to merge redundant an-
nouncements, though in this scheme S must match for
two routing advertisements to be merged. As above,
treatment of the metric can be a complex process.
VII. MODELING ROFL USING ROUTING ALGEBRA
We now discuss some practical issues when modeling
the new ROFL scheme with source prefix filtering using
the routing algebra [8], [13].
A. Metarouting
Routing algebra is motivated by the recognition that
a path may not be only associated by a metric cost, but
also can be abstractly associated by a signature. And the
operation that translates a signature on an in-coming link
to an out-going link can be heterogeneous on different
nodes of the network.
In the following, we briefly describe routing algebra
and discuss the relevance to ROFL. A routing algebra is
a tuple:
A = (Σ,, L,⊕,O)
where Σ is a set of signatures for describing paths, and
 is a preference relation over signatures, L is a set of
labels assigned by routers on the ongoing links, and ⊕ :
L×Σ → Σ is an operator that produces a signature when
a path with a certain signature is extended by a link with
a label.
A sufficient condition in routing algebra that guaran-
tees the existence of network-wide consistent condition
is monotonicity [13]:
λ⊗ σ  σ
for any σ ∈ Σ and λ ∈ L. The basic idea of monotonicity
is to make all extended paths carrying a less prefer-
able signature, and hence, creates loop-free preference.
Monotonicity is shown to imply a well-known condition
for the convergence in BGP with customer-provider-peer
relations [7].
Monotonicity also applies to distributed or hybrid
firewalling, such that the existence of robust firewall
configuration can be attained in a machine-checkable
manner. This lends the usefulness of routing algebra to
the context of security systems.
The more general setting of routing algebra allows us
to model sophisticated operations of ROFL, which other-
wise can not be regarded as shortest-path routing in the
Internet. We aim to prove that a sufficient condition that
is similar to monotonicity in policy-based routing will be
also useful to establish robust deployment of firewall by
ROFL. We will use our policy algebra — a formal model
of outsourced firewall policies — to map ROFL into the
routing algebra. Our goal is to show how the deploy-
ment of firewalls can be checked in an automatic manner
to guarantee that ROFL can converge to a network-wide
firewall enforcement in a deterministic manner, even in
the presence of asynchronous communications among
routers.
B. Policy Regions
A crucial question in any firewall is defining the policy
region associated with a particular service. As discussed
previously, our approach is to embed source prefix con-
straints in the routing announcement originating from
the service provider. Therefore, we use one basic routing
algebra TAGS(String) to define the set of routers allowed
to access the protected service. This information is em-
bedded in the initial routing announcement originated
from the service provider. We use another basic routing
algebra component PROGS(A) to extend labels to pro-
grammatic labels. We define that
λ⊕ σ =
{
λ1 ⊕ σ = σ
′ if u ∈ TAGS(String);
∞⊕ σ = φ otherwise.
Since λ⊕ φ = φ for all λ ∈ L, the routing announcement
for that protected service will never propagate out of the
defined policy region.
C. Cost and Risk Metrics
In ROFL, each routing announcement is associated
with a cost metric. Cost metric in the routing problem
is different from the one in the optimization problem.
In that problem, we are trying to find optimal policy
enforcement points in order to minimize the total cost. In
the routing problem, cost is incurred at each node along
the routing path. Cost determines route preference. It is
modeled as a label of a specific link.
To construct a routing protocol that satisfies M/SM,
we do not need a cost metric what increases monotoni-
cally as the routing announcement propagates. What we
need is only
M: σ  λ⊕ σ
SM: σ ≺ λ⊕ σ
This is true as long as the ⊕ operation of constructing
cost signature can be modeled as ADD(1, n) or some-
thing similar.
There are a number of approaches we can take. The
metric defined in Section III clearly meets these con-
straints, as long as either every link has a positive cost
or (for γ = 0) every node has a non-zero risk.
Other possibilities were discussed in [15]. The cost
metric in ROFL, for example, may reflect the size of the
routing table and the battery power of each node (which




We can define the risk metric simply as the number of
hops from the enforcement point (the node which imple-
ments the firewall rule as routing entry) to the protected
node (the node which provides that service). Therefore,
we can define the algebra associated with risk metric
as Risk = SEQ(0, n) = 〈ΣR,R, LR,⊗R,OR〉, where the
preference relation is defined as σ1  σ2 = |σ1| ≤ |σ2|,
the ⊕ operation is defined as i ⊕ σ = i :: σ.
Now we have two sub-algebras that capture the cost
and risk metric associated with path signatures. Since
now we have multiple route metrics when dealing with
route selection, we can apply the lexicographic compar-
ison in [9]: the most important attribute of each route
is considered first, and if this does not give enough
information to decide which route is better, the next
attribute is considered, etc.
D. Route Aggregation
To reduce the growth of routing table size, we intro-
duce the notion of aggregation points in ROFL. With
routing algebra, we can model this using scoped product
A⊙ B, where algebra A is used between administrative
entities, and algebra B is used inside for each adminis-
trative entities. Thus the path signature for algebra B is
updated each time within administrative entities; once
across the boundary, the path signature for algebra A is
updated with path signature for algebra B re-initialized.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Apart from adding source prefix filtering to ROFL, we
have accomplished three other things: we have shown
how to incorporate flexible tradeoffs between cost and
risk; we have devised a new approach to policy routing;
and we have shown how our scheme can be modeled
by metarouting.
It is well-known that trying to optimize according
to two different criteria is difficult, since maximizing
one criterion will sometimes cause an opposite effect
on another. Our equation permits each network or even
each node to balance two different criteria, according to
local needs.
This flexibility comes at a price, though: administrative
complexity. Not only must firewall rules be configured
for each node and service, itself an error-prone pro-
cedure [14], the appropriate values for cost, risk, and
the tradeoff (γ) must be set as well. This complexity
can be quite serious, especially in tactical MANETs,
where some changes will need to be made while under
enemy fire. The human interface issue will be explored
in a forthcoming work. That said, ROFL offers a major
complexity advantage over conventional firewalls: rules
are set locally and do not interact in the way that
conventional firewall rules can [3], [5]. This permits easy
introduction of new nodes and services, with much less
chance of a configuration error opening other services to
attack.
We would also like to extend our work to handle inter-
domain MANET routing [4]. At a minimum, cost, risk,
and γ will need to be per-domain values. That, however,
may result in routing oscillations. We conjecture that we
can use the routing algebra to establish appropriate rela-
tionships between the cost and risk values for different
domains, and thus avoid the problem.
Adding source prefix constraints to a routing pro-
tocol has always been problematic: it is often unclear
how to balance a packet that matches in one field (i.e.,
destination address) but does not match in the other:
which should dominate? By marrying routing to packet
filtering, we resolve that issue: a routing advertisement
for a given destination is forwarded to a neighbor if and
only if that neighbor is allowed to send packets to that
destination. There is thus no ambiguity; a forwarding
node’s routing tables can never contain such a conflict
for any packet it can legitimately pass along. We suggest
that this approach to policy routing may be useful in
other contexts.
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